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SYMPOSIUM ON SPORTS LAW
The Regulation of Academic Standards in
Intercollegiate Athletics
Ron Waicukauski*
Incidents of cheating have been periodic if not common occurrences in
intercollegiate athletics almost since its inception in 1852, when Yale first
met Harvard in a rowing contest on New Hampshire's Lake Win-
nipesaukee.' It was not then particularly surprising when Arizona State
University declared eight of its football players ineligible in November
1979 because they had received credit for an extension course they did
not attend.3 There ensued, however, a rash of reports of violations at other
universities, including New Mexico, Utah, Oregon, Oregon State, UCLA,
and Southern California.3 The result was a national scandal, the propor-
tions of which, in the words of an official report of the University of
Southern California, were "substantially larger and far less innocent"'
than earlier scandals.
The national news media extensively covered the recent scandal. News-
weeks and Sports Illustrated' published lengthy cover-page articles that
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law & Sports, Indiana University -
Bloomington. B.S. 1970, Northwestern University; J.D. 1973, Harvard Univesity; LL.M. 1976,
George Washington University.
I. Harvard won in a contest the character of which is suggested by a remark of one of the
Harvard crew, "that they had only rowed a few times for fear of blistering their hands." H. Savage,
American College Athletics (Bulletin No. 23; The Carnegie Foundation For The Advancement of
Teaching) 16-17 (1929). For an historical treatment of scandals in intercollegiate sports, see J.
BENAGH, MAKING IT To NUMBER ONE: How COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND BASKETBALL TEAMS GET
THERE (1976).
2. Arizona Republic, Nov. 28, 1979, at GI, col. I.
3. See Underwood, The Writing Is on the Wall, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 19, 1980, at 38-39.
4. University of Southern California, Academic Conduct, Admission, Advisement and Counseling
of Student-Athletes at the University of Southern California: A Report to the USC Community (Oct.
12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as USC Report].
5. The Shame of College Sports, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 1980, at 54.
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were sharply critical of intercollegiate athletics. Newsweek quoted Indi-
ana Basketball Coach Bobby Knight calling the situation "a monumental
swamp,'' 7 and Sports Illustrated spoke of a "student-athlete hoax," con-
cluding that college sports had become "an abomination to the ideals of
higher education."' CBS News was equally critical in a "60 Minutes"
segment which included an interview with a young man who could neither
read nor write after four years of attending college and playing intercolle-
giate football.' These reports suggest an epidemic of corruption in college
sports involving a variety of legal, ethical, and rule violations. The focus
of most of the criticism has been on the lack of academic integrity that
allegedly pervades intercollegiate athletics. Specifically, the nation's col-
leges and universities were called to task for: recruiting and admitting
athletes who patently lacked the intellectual tools to succeed academi-
cally; forging and altering transcripts; giving credit for courses not at-
tended; giving grades not warranted by the athlete's academic perform-
ance; channeling athletes into courses that are not meaningful; and failing
to provide the education or grant the degrees promised to athletes.
Historically, the nation's colleges and universities have relied primarily
on action by individual institutions to correct abuses of this sort. In 1948,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association adopted a code of conduct to
supplement the reliance on institutional control.10 This code has evolved
into an elaborate scheme of regulation designed in part to protect aca-
demic standards. Recently, athletes and others have asked courts to rec-
ognize legal rights in pursuit of similar ends." This article examines the
regulatory scheme of the NCAA in light of the legal initiatives underway
and the recent scandal, finds the scheme deficient in several respects, and
proposes specific reforms to remedy the deficiencies.
I. THE REGULATORY SCHEME
The NCAA was formed in 1906 to regulate and supervise college ath-
letics throughout the United States.1 2 It is a voluntary association dedi-
6. Underwood, supra note 3.
7. NEWSWEEK, supra note 5, at 54.
8. Underwood, supra note 3, at 38.
9. Broadcast on February 3, 1980; segment entitled, "Losers".
10. E. SHEA & E. WIEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 16
(1967).
I1. See infra text accompanying notes 111-56.
12. The NCAA was formally organized on March 31, 1906 following a conference convened late
in 1905 by President Theordore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was concerned in particular about brutality in
intercollegiate football and what he perceived as an increasingly pervasive win-at-any-cost philosophy.
He told the colleges to take remedial action or he would put an end to the whole enterprise. In
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cated to maintaining athletic activities "on an ethical plane in keeping
with the dignity and high purpose of education."1 s Almost all of the ma-
jor colleges and universities in the United States are members.14 There
are other national associations regulating intercollegiate sports, including
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) composed
of approximately 500 small four-year colleges and universities;' 5 the Na-
tional Junior College Athletic Associaton (NJCAA), with a membership
of about 600 two-year colleges in its men's division;' 6 and the Association
of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), controlling women's
sports for almost 800 colleges and universities.' 7 The NCAA, however, is
the oldest, wealthiest, and most powerful of the national associations, gov-
erning the largest, richest, and most popular sports programs in higher
education.' 8 Accordingly, regulation by the NCAA is the focus of this
inquiry.
Not all NCAA members engage in big-time college sports; the majority
in fact do not." To accomodate the differing sports interests and activities
response, the NCAA was formed "to codify, promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations which
would ensure proper behaviors on and off the field .... " Hanford, Controversies in College Sports.
445 ANNALS 66, 68 (1979); see Lewis, Theodore Roosevelt's Role in the 1905 Football Controversy.
40 RESEARCH Q. 717 (1969).
13. The first NCAA Constitution provided:
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the
United States, in order that the athletic activities of the colleges and universities of the
United States may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and
high purpose of education. The method of control selected was that the Colleges and
Universities enrolled in this Association severally agree to take control of student ath-
letic sports as far as may be necessary to maintain in them a high standard of personal
honor, eligibility and fair play, and to remedy whatever abuses exist.
E. SHEA & E. WIEMAN, supra note 10, at 14.
14. As of October 1980, the NCAA had 883 members consisting of 740 colleges and universities
who are active members and 143 other allied, associate, and affiliate members such as conferences
and other athletic organizations.
15. The Final Report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports 1975-1977, Vol. II, 325
(1977).
16. Id. at 383.
17. The AIAW active membership for 1981-1982 includes 772 institutions. Complaint, AIAW v.
NCAA, Civil No. - (D.D.C. October 1981). This represents a 20% decline from the 970 members
reported in the AIAW Handbook for 1980-1981. The principal reason for the decline is that begin-
ning in the 1981-1982 school year the NCAA is offering championships in women's sports and many
institutions have elected to drop their membership in the AIAW and pursue women's sports solely
under NCAA regulation.
18. It has been judicially noted that the NCAA is the "dominant" intercollegiate sports organiza-
tion. College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. v. NCAA. 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J.),
ajrd, No. 74-1904 (3d Cir., Nov. 25, 1974).
19. In 1980, of 740 NCAA colleges and universities participating in intercollegiate athletics, 271
were classified in Division I, 188 in Division !1, and 281 in Division Ill. NCAA ANNUAL REPORTS
1979-1980.
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of its members, the NCAA is divided into three divisions:' 0 Division I
consists predominantly of universities supporting big-time programs while
Divisions II and III are composed of universities that maintain more mod-
est programs.21 NCAA regulations vary in some respects among these di-
visions. For example, Division II is more restrictive than Division I in the
number of athletic grants-in-aid that may be awarded," and Divison III,
unlike Divisions I and II, prohibits awarding financial aid to any student-
athlete except upon a showing of financial need.'"
All divisions are subject to the principal NCAA rules governing aca-
demic standards in intercollegiate athletics. These rules are guided by the
,onstitutionally prescribed "Fundamental Policy" of the Association to
maintain intercollegiate athletics "as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body."', This
policy is implemented initially through Article Three, Section 3 of the
Constitution. This provision, entitled the "Principle of Sound Academic
Standards," imposes four requirements for a student-athlete to be eligible
to represent his institution in intercollegiate athletic competition.' 5 First,
20. For purposes of intercollegiate football,,the NCAA is also divided into Division I-A and I-
AA, further separating the truly big-time institutions from the others. Pursuant to legislation passed
at a special convention held on December 4-5, 1981, in order to be a member of Division I-A, an
institution must have had an average home football attendance of 17,000 over the last four years or a
home stadium capacity of 30,000. Approximately 94 institutions should qualify (down from 137),
leaving 90 schools in Division I-AA (up from 50). St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 6, 1981, at 8.
21. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of NCAA Bylaw Article 10 describe the criteria for membership in
Divisions i, 11 and Ill. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 10-
I to 10-3, reprinted in NATURAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsSOCIATION, 1981-1982 MANUAL OF THE
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHILETIC AssOcIATION 108-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NCAA
MANUAL].
22. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 6-5, reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 90-93.
23. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 10-3-(a), reprinted
in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at I11.
24. Fundamental Policy. (a) The competitive athletic programs of the colleges are
designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Associa-
tion is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 7-8.
25. Principle of Sound Academic Standards. (a) A student-athlete shall not represent an
institution in intercollegiate athletic competition unless the student-athlete: (1) Has
been admitted in accordance with the regular published entrance requirements of that
institution; (2) Is in good academic standing as determined by the faculty of that insti-
tution, in accordance with the standards applied to all students, and (3) Is enrolled in at
least a minimum full-time program of studies and is maintaining satisfactory progress
toward a baccalaureate or equivalent degree as determined by the regulations of that
institution, except that a student-athlete who is enrolled in less than a minimum full-
time program of studies and has athletic eligibility remaining may participate if the
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the student-athlete must be admitted in accordance with the regular pub-
lished entrance requirements of the institution. Second, he must be in
good academic standing with the university in accordance with the stan-
dards applied to all students. Third, he must be enrolled in a minimum
full-time program of studies. And fourth, he must be making satisfactory
progress toward a degree.
These constitutional requirements are supplemented by provisions in
the NCAA bylaws to insure that college athletes are genuine students.
Bylaw 5-1-(c) requires that an athlete be registered in a minimum of 12
hours of courses to be eligible to participate in an NCAA championship
in any sport .2  Bylaw 5-1-(j)-(2) adds that a freshman will not be eligible
for Division I competition unless he has graduated from high school with
a minimum 2.000 grade point average on a 4.000 scale.2 7 Student-athletes
transferring from junior colleges to NCAA institutions are subject to re-
strictions requiring that they demonstrate a minimal level of academic
competence before participating in NCAA competition. Most notable
among these restrictions is the recently enacted requirement that the ath-
lete graduate from junior college to be eligible during his first year at a
student-athlete is carrying for credit the courses necessary to complete degree require-
ments as determined by the faculty of the institution. Further, a student-athlete who
has received a baccalaureate or equivalent degree and who is enrolled in the graduate
or professional school of the institution attended as an undergraduate, or who is en-
rolled and seeking a second baccalaureate or equivalent degree at the same institution,
may participate in intercollegiate athletics provided the student-athlete has athletic eli-
gibility remaining and such participation occurs within five years after initial enroll-
ment in a collegiate institution.
NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 16-17.
26. The student-athlete must, at the time of competition, be registered for at least a mini-
mum full-time program of studies as defined by the institution, which, in any event,
shall not be less than 12 semester hours or 12 quarter hours (or a similar minimum
academic load as determined by the NCAA Eligibility Committee in an institution
which determines registration other than on a traditional semester or quarter hour basis
or conducts a cooperative education program; or a minimum full-time graduate pro-
gram as defined by the institution and approved by the NCAA Eligibility Committee in
the event fewer than 12 hours are required, but which may be no fewer than eight
hours); further, if the competition takes place between terms, the student-athlete must
have been so registered in the term immediately preceding the date of competition.
Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-1-(c), reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 70.
27. "An entering freshman with no previous college attendance who matriculates as a 2.000 non-
qualifier in a Division I institution and whose matriculation was solicited per 0.1. 100 shall not be
eligible for financial aid, regular-season competition and practice during the first academic year in
residence." Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-1-(j)-(2),
reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 73.
28. See, e.g., Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-1-6)-
(8) & (10), 5-(I)-(k), 5-(I)-(n), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 75-77, 81.
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Division I institution if he did not achieve a 2.000 grade point average in
high school.2 '
Another recently enacted bylaw strengthens the constitutional require-
ment that a student-athlete make satisfactory progress toward a degree
by specifying that he complete 12 semester or quarter hours for each term
he has been enrolled to remain eligible for competition after his freshman
year. 0
Academic standards are protected by the NCAA, not only through
these constitutional provisions and bylaws adopted by the full NCAA
membership at the annual NCAA convention, but also through official
interpretations adopted by the NJCAA Council, the body which governs
between conventions, or by the president, secretary-treasurer, and execu-
tive director, between meetings of the council.3 1 One such interpretation,
Official Interpretation 8, seeking to avoid a repetition of the recent scan-
dal, excludes the use of correspondence and extension courses taken from
other institutions in determining "academic standing" or "satisfactory
progress", rendering such courses useless for maintaining eligibility."
In addition to these regulations that directly control academic stan-
dards, the NCAA has many other regulations with the purpose or effect
of protecting academic standards in college sports. Article 3 of the
NCAA Bylaws limits playing and practice seasons in football, soccer, and
basketball.33 It also limits the number of games that may be played in
29. NCAA Bylaw 5-1-0)-(9) provides: "A transfer student from a junior college who was a 2.000
nonqualifier is not eligible in Division I institutions for financial aid, practice, regular-season competi-
tion and for any NCAA championships the first academic year in residence unless the student has
graduated from the junior college." Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association 5-1-(j)-(9), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 75-76.
30. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-1-(j)-(6), re-
printed in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 74.
31. See NCAA CONST. art 6, § 2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 38. Article Six
of the NCAA Constitution also speaks of "Executive Regulations" and "Resolutions." Neither of
these appear to be of consequence in the regulation of academic standards and are therefore not
treated herein.
32. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 3, 0.1. 8, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 17-18.
33. NCAA Bylaw 3-1 prohibits preseason practice as follows: In basketball - before October 15;
in football - 19 days before the first game or 22 days before the next-to-last Saturday in September
or on that date which will permit no more than 29 "practice opportunities" prior to the first game;
and, in soccer - before September I or on the first day of classes or 19 days prior to the first game.
NCAA Bylaw 3-2 limits the playing seasons as follows: In basketball - to the period from the last
Saurday in November for Division I and the next-to-the-last Saturday for Divisions !1 and III to the
date of the championship game in the NCAA Basketball Tournament; in football, and soccer - "to
the traditional fall season" with provision for a spring football game and one post-season contest.
Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 3-1, 3-2, reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 62-65.
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these sports.34 The effect of these limitations is to reduce the time some
student-athletes must spend away from studies.
Probably the most complex and detailed rules of the NCAA regulate
recruiting. Among other things, these rules limit the financial aid or bene-
fits that may be offered to an athlete, his relatives, or friends as an in-
ducement to attend a particular school."' Presumably, the athlete then
will make his decision based on appropriate educational concerns rather
than considerations unrelated to his educational goals. The rules provide
that representatives of an institution may contact a student in person only
three times at his high school and three times at sites away from the
school.8s A prospect may visit a campus only once at the institution's ex-
pense, and that visit may not exceed 48 hours.37 Prospects are limited to
six paid visits to NCAA institutions."8 No tryouts are permitted. 9 These
restrictions all serve to reduce the disruption to the athlete's high school
studies caused by the recruiting process.40
NCAA regulations exclude from eligibility in a sport any athlete who
has received pay for participating in that sport."' Institutions may provide
financial aid to a student-athlete, but such aid is limited essentially to
tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.'2
The intent is to limit intercollegiate sports to genuine amateurs-studefts,
who participate in sport as an avocation.' s Presumably, their principal ac-
34. NCAA Bylaw 3-3 limits the number of games in basketball to 27 in Divisions I and il, 26 in
Division 1l; in football to II; and in soccer to 22. For purposes of these restrictions, football bowl
games, post-season tournament basketball games and games in Hawaii and Alaska are not counted.
Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 3-3, reprinted in NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 21, at 65-66.
35. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 1-1-(b), reprinted
in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 43.
36. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 1-2, reprinted in
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 43-44.
37. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 1-8-(a), reprinted
in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50.
38. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 1-8-(e), reprinted
in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 51.
39. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association l-6-(a), reprinted
in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 48.
40. These restrictions also serve other purposes including perhaps, most importantly, "to reduce
recruiting and operating costs by restraining competition." Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 138 (1973).
41. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1-(a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 9. It is possi-
ble for a student to be a professional in one sport and participate in NCAA competition in another.
42. NCAA CONST. art. 3 §§ 1-(g), 4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 12, 18.
43. This idea is expressed in the "Principle of Amateurism and Student Participation": "An
amatuer student-athlete is one who engages ina particular sport for the educational, physical, mental
and social benefits derived therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is an avocation."
NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 9.
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tivity is not athletics but getting an education.
In a similar vein, NCAA bylaws 5-1-(d) and 4-1 limit eligibility for a
student-athlete to four seasons of intercollegiate competition during five
calendar years beginning with the term in which he first registers."' By-
law 5-1-(d)-(3) adds that participation in any organized competition in a
sport during any twelve-month period after the student's twentieth birth-
day and prior to matriculation at an NCAA institution shall count as one
year of competition.45 The net result of these three provisions is to restrict
NCAA competition to individuals who have certain credentials associated
with real students-they are only temporarily engaged in the college sport
(no more than four seasons in five years) and are relatively inexperienced,
not having engaged in the organized sport for more than four years after
reaching age 20.
Considered collectively, these regulations present an extraordinary set
of detailed requirements. Indeed, no other area of higher education is as
heavily controlled by extra-institutional regulation as intercollegiate
sports."' In addition to the regulations of the NCAA, which constitute the
bulk of a 300-page manual, most universities are members of athletic con-
ferences which prescribe additional rules. For example, the Big Ten Con-
ference has an elaborate regulatory system, described in a 163-page con-
ference handbook, which is in many respects more stringent than the
NCAA. 7
These NCAA and conference regulations are not mere window dress-
ing, simply to be ignored; at least in some cases, institutions must follow
them to the letter or risk substantial penalties. In 1978 and 1979, a con-
gressional investigation focused on the elaborate NCAA enforcement pro-
gram, not because it was too weak, but because it was, allegedly, too
harsh and unfair."' The NCAA employs a full time staff of thirteen in its
enforcement division, including eight investigators.' 9 This staff assists the
NCAA Committee on Infractions in developing information about viola-
tions of the NCAA's academic and athletic standards. 0 If a violation is
44. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 4-I, 5-1-(d), re-
printed in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 69-71.
45. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-1-(d)-(3), re-
printed in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 70-71.
46. Gerber, The Legal Basis for the Regulation of Intercollegiate Sport, 60 EDUC. REC. 467, 481
(1979). See Weistart, Forward, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PRORS. 1 (1973).
47. Handbook of the Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference (1980).
48. NCAA Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. and 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1978-1979) (hereinafter NCAA Enforcement Hearings).
49. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 190.
50. Official Procedure Governing the NCAA Enforcement Program §§ 2-3, reprinted in NCAA
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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found, the Committee on Infractions is empowered to impose a variety of
penalties ranging from a private reprimand and censure to closing down
an institution's intercollegiate sports program for a specified period."' The
NCAA Council has similar power acting essentially in the capacity of an
appellate tribunal.52 The most severe penalty that the association can im-
pose is to expel a member; that action may only be taken by the full
membership at its annual convention."
During its first 25 years in operation from 1952-1977, the NCAA en-
forcement machinery considered 993 cases and took disciplinary action in
548." In most cases, the penalty was mild, but there are numerous in-
stances in which punitive action was substantial. 8 The most severe was
the penalty imposed in 1973 on the University of Southwestern Louisiana
for numerous willful violations of rules governing recruiting, financial aid,
and admission requirements. For these offenses, the Association excluded
the university's basketball team from all competition for two years, placed
all sports on probation for four years, and for that period, denied the uni-
versity voting and membership privileges on NCAA committees." The
NCAA has strong enforcement tools available and has demonstrated the
will to use them.
The athletic conferences also have enforcement authority and are using
it. On August 11, 1980, The Pacific Ten Conference declared five of its
members ineligible for the league's 1980 football championship and post-
season games, including the Rose Bowl. s7 The Conference imposed the
penalties for "violations of conference rules and standards in the areas of
unearned credits, falsified transcripts, and unwarranted intrusion of ath-
letic department interests into the academic process of the respective uni-
versities."" A complicated controversy with the University of Illinois and
quarterback David Wilson recently involved the Big Ten. The crux of the
dispute was that the Conference was unwilling to soften its academic
standards for the benefit of Wilson. Based on certain actions by Illinois
MANUAL, supra note 21, at 163-64.
51. Section 7-(b) of the Enforcement Program lists twelve disciplinary measures available to the
Committee on Infractions and the NCAA Council. Official Procedure Governing the NCAA Enforce-
ment Program § 7-(b), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 166-67.
52. Official Procedure Governing the NCAA Enforcement Program §§ 5-7, reprinted in NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 21, at 165-67.
53. NCAA CONST. art. 4, § 6, reprinted In NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 29-30.
54. NCAA Enforcement Hearings. supra note 48, at 1512.
55. See NCAA Enforcement Summary in NCAA Enforcement Hearings, supra note 48, follow-
ing 1512.
56. Id.
57. Chron. Higher Educ., Aug. 25, 1980, at 3.
58. Id.
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personnel in handling the Wilson matter, the Conference believed that the
university was not adequately dedicated "to conference principles which
'place academic standards ahead of athletic interests."" Accordingly, the
Conference placed the university on probation, prohibited its participation
in post-season football contests for one year, and excluded it from sharing
certain conference revenues resulting in a loss to the university of an esti-
mated $500,000.60
From this cursory review, it appears that the regulatory scheme of the
NCAA and its member conferences is adequate to protect the academic
integrity of intercollegiate sports. Regulations, supported by powerful en-
forcement machinery, -purport to insure that the athletes who represent
the nation's colleges are academically qualified to be genuine students and
that they are successfully pursuing a full-time course of study toward a
degree. The reality, though, is that they fail to achieve either objective.
II. REGULATING ADMISSIONS
The preponderance of the evidence available demonstrates that many
Institutions are enrolling athletes who are not academically qualified for
college. Consider the case of the University of Southern California. Over
the years it has won 63 NCAA team titles, far more than any other
school and 17 Rose Bowls, and it has been named national football cham-
pion eight times. 1 Athletes who were admitted to the university by the
department of athletics achieved at least some of these honors. Dr. John
Hubbard, former president of USC, told the admissions office "to keep
hands off. ' '62 Between 1970 and 1980, the athletics department exercised
its admission authority to enroll 330 students "based chiefly on athletic
prowess" although academically they "fell below normal USC standards
of admission."" As Red Smith, dean of American sportswriters said, the
cheating at USC may have been "more widespread, more brazen, more
cynical than elsewhere," 4 but there appears little reason to believe that
USC is unique in enrolling athletes unqualified to be students.
Some institutions have admitted functionally illiterate athletes. Fred
Butler was an outstanding high school football player at Morningside
High School in Englewood, California. He graduated 190th out of 355
59. Report, Decision of the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives Concerning the
University of Illinois (April 27, 1981) at 19 [hereinafter cited as Faculty Representatives Report].
60. Chi. Tribune, Aug. 6, 1981, § 3, at I, col. I.
61. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 27, 1980, at 19.
62. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, at B8, col. 3.
63. USC Report, supra note 4, at 9.
64. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, § 5 at 4, col. 1.
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students in his high school class and then went to El Camino Junior Col-
lege where he led the football team to a conference championship. He.
moved on to California State University at Los Angeles where he com-
pleted the remaining years of his college athletic eligibility. At the time of
his admission, and even after four years of attending college, Fred Butler
could not read or write. He is unable even to read a menu in a restaurant
and must rely on pictures or the assistance of a friend."
Illiterate statements from student-athletes in NCAA files demonstrate
vividly that Fred Butler is not an isolated example.66 Sports sociologist
Harry Edwards estimates that 20 to 25% of black athletes at four-year
colleges are functionally illiterate, 67 and clearly, the problem of illiteracy
is not restricted to blacks. It is obvious why universities seek to admit
such students-to better compete on the athletic field and thereby reap
the enormous rewards which now accrue to those who are successful in
intercollegiate sports. 68 What is not so obvious is how such students are
admitted in compliance with NCAA regulations.
As outlined above, to be eligible for NCAA competition, a student-
athlete must have "been admitted in accordance with the regular pub-
lished entrance requirements of that institution"" and if a freshman in
Division I, must have accumulated a 2.000 high school grade point aver-
age on a 4.000 scale.70 In practice, these requirements have not proved to
be a significant obstacle to the enrollment of academically deficient ath-
letes. The requirement that athletes be admitted in accordance with regu-
lar published entrance requirements is of almost no force because the
"regular published entrance requirements" of most universities are suf-
ficiently flexible to qualify persons with little or no academic ability. Even
the extraordinary admission practices of the University of Southern Cali-
fornia are probably in compliance. As representatives of the university
65. Chi. Tribune, Nov. 5, 1978, § I, at 1, col. 2.
66. SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, May 19, 1980, at 39.
"I think he [a coach] did visied me a school one . . . .Since I have been at [the
school], Coach [name deleted] have not give me any money, period. But he have lend
me five to tin dollars but I have paid it back to." And, "Coach [name deleted] give me
a 5 or 6 dr. to do my clothis with but other than that he have not give me any money."
67. THE PROGRESSIVE, April 1979, at 48.
68. Fordham Basketball Coach Tom Penders observes, "Unfortunately, board scores are usually
inversely proportionate to a kids athletic ability." N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1981, § V, at 4, col. 2. He
laments that only five per cent of quality high school players qualify for admission at his institution.
Id. Obviously, if he cannot get that five per cent, he will be at a tremendous competitive disadvantage
unless the institution's admissions standards are lowered.
69. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 3-(a)-(l), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 16.
70. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-(l)-(i)-(2), re-
printed in. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 73.
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'have explained, the school enrolled the athletes under a special program
designed for disadvantaged students who fail to meet the usual require-
ments for admission.7 1 As it turned out, approximately 25% of USC's to-
tal undergraduate special admissions were scholarship athletes.7 2 Other
schools also have not hesitated to abuse similar programs to serve athletic
ends.7a The NCAA investigated one school in the Southwest and found
half the special admissions were scholarship athletes. 74 Stephen Morgan
of the NCAA's enforcement division reported, "We've seen some aca-
demic records for athletes that were almost laughable. But when we ap-
* proach the school, they say, 'we have no minimum standards.' ",7" Conse-
quently, the NCAA has yet to find its first violation of the rule requiring
application of regular published admission standards."
The 2.000 Rule has more teeth but not many. If high school transcripts
were accurate and if satisfactory grades in high school really meant that a
student had demonstrated some academic competence, the rule would be
/iieaningful. Often, however, neither of these requisite conditions are met.
Some high schools today "grant a 2.0 average if a warm body appears in
class without slugging the teacher . . . . Even in those schools that
maintain meaningful standards, outstanding athletes who have the oppor-
tunity to receive an NCAA athletic grant-in-aid often receive gratuitous
grades. The NCAA reports seeing transcripts of outstanding athletes who
go into their final year of high school with a 1.7 average and receive a 3.0
average or better in their senior year without attending class to finish with
the requisite 2.0.78 If the teachers fail to "help the kid out" by inflating
his grades, school administrators and athletic departments sometimes fal-
Vsify transcripts "so that young athletes turn up with A's and B's where
71. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, § B, at 5, col. I.
72. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 27, 1980, at 19.
73. Jim Benagh reports in his book, MAKING IT To NUMBER ONE, that for many years, Rutgers
University had difficulty competing in big-time intercollegiate sports because of its academic entrance
requirements. That, however, changed when the university opened the doors of its Livingston College
to "underprivileged youth with the potential to benefit from higher education though lacking the
necessary academic background. Before long, Livingston College was filled up with black athletes.
Good ones." J. BENAGH, supra note 1, at 70.
74. J. UNDERWOOD, THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN GAME 248 (1979).
75. Chron. Higher Educ., Dec. 15, 1980, at 8, col. I.
76. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 27, 1980, at 19.
77. J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 198 (1976).
78. Id. The gift of unearned grades is one illustration of what Robert Lipsyte calls "The Varsity
Syndrome" in which athletes are granted privileges denied the rest of us. "Those privileges begin with
favors and gifts in grade school, little presents like an unearned diploma, perhaps a college scholar-
ship. Athletes are waved, as it were, through the toll booths of life." Lipsyte, Varsity Synrome: The
, Unkindest Cut, ANNALS 15, 19 (1979).
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they originally had D's and F's."'79 The result is that high school grades
are now seldom a factor in schools with big-time sports.80
There are, of course, some athletes who are unable legitimately or ille-
gitimately to obtain the requisite high school transcript with a 2.0 aver-
age. For such athletes, the junior colleges offer a viable route to big-time
college sports. Usually, a high school degree is not needed, and once en-
rolled, the athlete can often achieve sufficient academic success to move
on to a four-year NCAA institution without any real demonstration of
academic competence. Witness the Fred Butler case; likewise, the case of
David Wilson, the Illinois quarterback. Wilson was a nonqualifier in high
school with a 1.81 grade point average. 81 In junior college he accumulated
a much improved 2.63 grade point average largely through excellent
grades in basketball, racquetball, body development, weight training, and
seven courses in football, which served to overshadow poor grades in such
courses as reading and composition, philosophy, and American litera-
ture.8" This academic performance fully satisfied NCAA requirements.
A few years ago NCAA requirements were somewhat tougher, at least
for incoming freshman. From 1966 to 1973, to be eligible, a freshman had
to "predict" an ability to maintain a 1.600 grade point average (C-) in
college, based upon (1) high school grades or rank in class and (2) a score
on a scholastic aptitude examination.8 The rule was intended to accom-
plish three objectives: to reduce the possibility of exploiting young athletes
by recruiting those who would likely be unable to meet the necessary aca-
demic requirements for a degree; to foster the concept that college sports
are engaged in by athletes who were first and primarily students; and to
encourage the student who could not meet the requirements of the rule to
devote his full freshman year to study and not engage in athletics." Not-
withstanding such noble purposes, the rule proved too restrictive for. the
79. J. MICHENER," supra note 77, at 198. Michener adds, "I have six such cases on my desk as I
write." Id. This activity is not a recent phenomenon. Savage noted in his 1929 report for the Carnegie
Foundation: "Grades assigned by school teachers for particular courses are known to have been raised
by certifying officers on solicitation of college coaches or alumni in order to enable boys to slip easily
into college. The complaints of not a few college officials, verified by field agents of this study, indi-
cate that these dishonest practices are far more extensive than is generally realized." Savagem supra
note 1.
80. J. BENAGH, supra note I, at 70.
81. Faculty Representatives Report, supra note 59, at 4.
82. Wilson's jupior college transcript was incorporated in the complaint in Wilson v. NCAA et
al., No. 80-C-801 (Illinois Circuit Court, 6th District, Champaign County, filed Aug. 19, 1980).
83. Note, Judicial Review of Disputes Between Athletes and The National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 24 STAN. L. REv. 903, 905 (1972), citing the NCAA MANUAL 1971-1972 at 40-44, 45-
48.
84. Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1974).
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NCAA membership who discarded it in 1973 in favor of the more relaxed
2.000 rule.88 One effect of the change is that a substantial percentage of
present major college athletes fail to meet even the relatively low 1.600
test.
In fairness, the problem of maintaining academic standards in admis-
sions is not limited to athletes. With the advent in recent years of affirma-
tive action programs, declining college enrollments, open admission poli-
cies, decreasing SAT scores, and increasing illiteracy among high school
graduates, many young men and women are admitted into college, but
they are unequipped by training and intellect to do college level work.86 In
a sense, the academic deficiencies of athletes are merely one part of a
much larger problem afflicting higher education in America. 87 It is, how-
ever, a part with special attributes that may be analyzed and addressed
separately.
The rewards for success in intercollegiate athletics to schools, coaches,
and athletes present Unique incentives for abusing the admissions process.
It is clear that such abuses are occurring. Universities may be admitting
other poor students, but on the average, athletes have lower school
records, test scores, and academic prediction at the time of admission
than their non-athlete classmates. 88 Moreover, unlike most other students
of limited academic ability, they are intensely recruited to attend college
and awarded grants-in-aid for virtually all their college expenses. The ex-
isting NCAA rules are one regulatory response to athletic abuses of the
admissions process. As written, however, in the circumstances of contem-
mIrary American education, they are inadequate. Perhaps a complete cure
must await resolution of the broader issues in education, but more can
and should be done to address directly the separable problem of bending
admission standards for athletic purposes.
85. See Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 158-59
(1973) (explaining that pressure for special admissions and concern for institutional autonomy were
the principal reasons given for the change).
86. See T. GROSS, ACADEMIC TURMOIL: THE REALITY AND PROMISE OF OPEN EDUCATION
(1980), (noting, inter alia, that open admissions at The City College of New York meant opening
college doors to "excessive numbers of poorly trained students," at I 1, and that "the most dramatic
reason why literacy became a national problem was the opening of admissions everywhere." at 60); S.
BLUMENFELD, THE NEW ILLITERATES (1973) ("In the last twenty years the United States has under-
gone a staggering degeneration of its literary skills, on all levels of society, affecting small children in
school, high school students, college students, factory workers, corporation executives, from ghetto
dropouts to suburban middle-class youths," at 23).
87. See The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education: A Summary of Reports
and Recommendations (1980).
88. G. HANFORD, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION ON AN INQUIRY INTO THE
'-NEED FOR AND FEASIBILITY OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 131 (1974)
(hereinafter cited as THE HANFORD REPORT).
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III. REGULATING ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Admission is just the first point in an athlete's college career at which
the NCAA may seek to protect academic standards. Further opportuni-
ties are presented during the athlete's years of possible eligibility. As de-
scribed above,89 the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws provide a variety of
regulations affecting this period to insure that the athlete is performing
satisfactorily as a student. Their success in achieving that goal is uncer-
tain at best.
One potential measure of that success is the percentage of athletes that
,graduate. If an athlete earns a degree, that is strong (though not conclu-
sive) evidence that his academic performance was adequate and that he
was a genuine student. Unfortunately, there are no good comprehensive
statistics about this basic fact. Various limited studies suggest that a large
percentage of student-athletes fail to graduate. For example, a study of
the Southwest Conference indicates that only one-third of black athletes
graduate, although approximately three-quarters of the white athletes
do. 0 Harry Edwards surveyed the graduation rate of black scholarship
athletes at the University of California from 1971 to 1978 and found that
"between 70% and 80% didn't graduate--even the ones who came to
Berkeley with two years of junior college."' 1 An older study at Michigan
State University found that for students entering between 1960 and 1964,
83% of the white athletes and 46.3% of the black athletes had graduated
by 1970." A recent survey of professional athletes, the majority of whom
participated in college athletics for four years, disclosed that 70% of pro-
fessional basketball players do not have college degrees and 80% of foot-
ball players coming into the NFL in 1981 had failed to earn college
degrees."
89. See supra text accompanying notes 12-60.
90. Burwell, Scholarship Athletes: Is There Life After Football?, Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 26,
1979, at 21.
91. Underwood, supra note 3, at 65. The University of California undertook an official study to
determine its graduation rates. A short oral report was made concerning this study to the NCAA
Convention in January 1981, in which it was indicated that the graduation rate for California athletes
was roughly equal to that for nonathletes. The actual data, however, has not been made public and
requests by the author for the data have been denied.
92. Brown, Race, Sport, and Academe, Report, of the Task Force on the Black Athlete, in THE
HANFORD REPORT, supra note 88, at 67. The report also disclosed the following: "At the University
of Washington between 1957-1967, seven black football players graduated, 13 did not; at the Univer-
sity of Oregon between 1965-1968, six black athletes graduated, five did not; at the University of
Utah only 12 of 46 black athletes eventually received degrees; and at Utah State only nine of 40
black athletes graduated .... " Id.
93. H. Edwards, "Exploitation and the NCAA," Presentation at the Second Annual Conference
of the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport (Nov. 15, 1981). J. Durso reports the
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On May 1, 1981, the NCAA released a report of the largest study yet
done on graduation rates of student-athletes. 4 It indicates that of male
athletes entering 46 colleges in Fall 1975, 52% had graduated by spring
1980 (wihtin five years) and that among the 46 colleges the median grad-
uation rate for athletes was 36.9%.'" Another 13.5% of the athletes were
still enrolled in their institutions, apparently continuing to pursue a de-
gree.96 The graduation rates for athletes in football (42.9%) and basket-
ball (41.9%) were lower than in other sports.97 Comparing this data with
the graduation rate of nonathletes, the study reported that the athletes
had done better: 52% graduating versus 41.5%. 98
Although this data may be the most comprehensive yet produced, it
must be interpreted with caution. Initially, the NCAA randomly selected
200 institutions for the study; it ultimately gathered usable data from a
less-than-random 46, or 23%.01 No doubt, many of the institutions with
the least impressive graduation rates were among those who failed to co-
operate with the study. In addition, the study fails to disclose how many
of these 46 colleges engage in big-time intercollegiate competition and to
what extent the final figures are affected by the success of athletes at
Division II and III institutions where it is generally recognized that the
academic problems of athletes are less severe.
In any event, the finding that 52% of athletes graduate within five years
is hardly comforting. It may exceed the graduation rate for nonathletes,
but the comparison is not entirely apt since nonathletes rarely receive full
grants-in-aid for, effectively, their entire college career. In view of such
aid, one would expect a substantially higher graduation rate for scholar-
ship athletes in comparison with nonathletes, many of whom must dropout of school for lack of funds. A more revealing comparison would be
between those athletes who compete in college sports for four years with
results of an earlier survey indicating that 63% of NBA players had earned college degrees. J. DURSO,
THE SPORTS FACTORY 82 (1975).
94. NCAA News Release, Graduation Rate Higher for College Athletes Than for Nonathletes,
(May 1, 1981).
95. INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, AMERICAN
COLLEGE TESTING PROGRAM, National Collegiate Athletic Association - Survey of Graduation Rates
After Five Years for Males First Entering College in Fall 1975, (April 1981) 5.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 5, 9.
99. Id. at I. Significantly, the report noted an earlier survey done by the American College Test-
ing Program (ACT) for the NCAA in which usable data was obtained from 25% of the institutions
solicited. The ACT remarked, "Because of the poor response rate, the statistics had to be interpreted
with caution since data from responding colleges may have differed from non-responding colleges."
Although no similar note of caution was sounded concerning the results of the current study, it is
clearly warranted.
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scholarship nonathletes who attend college for four years. The relative
dearth of respectable unbiased graduation rate data, combined with the
lack of cooperation the NCAA has received in its efforts to survey the
area, even though the data should be readily available in the files of
NCAA institutions, suggests that for many schools the statistics are em-
barrassing.100 Whatever the percentage, there are clearly a large number
of college athletes, recruited with a promise of an education, who are not
receiving degrees.
For many of these athletes, there may be no harm done as a result of
this failure. For those few who go on to successful careers in professional
sports, the absence of a degree may be no liability.101 For others, the fail-
ure to earn a degree may mean that they are no better off by virtue of
their college athletic experience, but they are probably no worse off ei-
ther. They are not likely to have fewer or poorer employment opportuni-
ties than would otherwise have been available to them. To the extent that
participation in athletics may have obstructed educational opportunities
by interfering with essential study time, inducing them to schedule useless'
courses, or removing incentives to learn by being assured of satisfactory
grades regardless of performance, then they have been hurt. The available
evidence, however, indicates generally no negative correlation between
participation in athletics and the academic success of individual athletes.
The principal and pervasive harm resulting from the educational inade-
quacies of college athletes is to the integrity of our academic institutions:
If athletes are not doing the work of genuine students, then a sham is
being perpetrated. Institutions of higher education, which should be bas-
tions of high ideals, are party to a hoax in which they are representing to
the American public that the young men playing on their teams are real
students. Too often in reality they are paid professional athletes, not re-
motely engaged in the full-time pursuit of scholarly objectives. The col-
leges and universities that contribute to this hoax may succeed on the
playing field but are worthy of little respect in the community of scholars.
The NCAA has long sought to avoid such a hoax by mandating in its
constitution that to remain eligible an athlete must be "maintaining satis-
100. Some institutions appear to have relied on the Buckley Amendment as an excuse for failing
to produce this information. As long as the data relates solely to graduation and particularly, if it
does not identify individuals, concern with provisions of the Act are unjustified. See Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1974).
101. George McGinnis, for example, left Indiana after his sophomore year to play in the ABA,
and has prospered without a degree. He concluded "College did me no good whatsoever ... I got a
right to earn a living, and I don't have to be a college grad to do it." Of course, for the average pro
athlete, the rewards are not as great and are available over only a few years. For such pros, the lack
of degree may well be a handicap over the long term. J. BENAGH, supra note I, at 129.
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factory progress toward a baccalaureate or equivalent degree." Until re-
cently, the individual institutions solely determined "satisfactory pro-
gress." As a result, athletes have not infrequently completed four years of
eligibility, making "reasonable progress" in each year as defined by the
institution, and yet remained far short of a degree, when their eligibility
was exhausted. 02 There is usually no problem with the athlete registering
for the requisite 12 hours each term which bylaw 5-1-(c) requires. Com-
pleting those courses, though, presents more difficulties. Some athletes,
particularly in their last term of competition, register for the requisite
hours, never attend class, and then drop out after the final game. 08
At the January 1981 Convention, the NCAA adopted a normal pro-
gress rule requiring that an athlete complete 12 hours of credit each term
to remain eligible.'0 4 This will not solve the problem, but it is a significant
step in the right direction. It will still be possible for an athlete to accu-
mulate the requisite credits each term in courses at the introductory level
and in subject areas that will not fulfill degree requirements. Thus, we
may still see an O.J. Simpson complete his college football career while
56 credit hours short of a degree,1 05 but the frequency of such cases
should diminish.
One continuing problem affecting the academic performance of stu-
dent-athletes is the time and energy required for practice and participa-
tion in major college sports. There is little doubt that to compete in sports
at the highest college levels requires such a substantial investment of the
athlete's time and energy as to seriously detract from his studies. Some
athletes have even found it "next to impossible to be a legitimate student
and a football player too."'" NCAA regulations of practice and playing
seasons in basketball, football, and soccer may curb but do not eliminate
the problem. Moreover, no effort has yet been made to control other
sports where the problem is now perhaps most severe. In college baseball,
athletes are now expected to play up to 100 game schedules or more and
still fulfill their duties as students.107
102. Underwood reports that a University of Cincinnati basketball player, after competing for
four years, had accumulated approximately 50 credits, barely 25% of the number required by the
school for graduation. Underwood, supra note 3, at 44.
103. Bob Knight, Transcript of Forum, The Scandals in Intercollegiate Sports: How Should the
Universities Respond 15, Indiana University, Bloomington (Nov. 7, 1980).
104. Bylaws and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 5-(I)-(j)-(6). re-
printed in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 74.
105. Student-Athletes: Tackling The Problem, PHI DELTA KAPPAN 7, 12 (Sept. 1980) (comment
by J. Underwood in discussion edited by B. Hammel).
106. Meggyesy, Football and Education, in J; ScoTt, THE ATHLETIC REVOLUTION 57 (1971).
107. The 1981-1982 Arizona State baseball team, defending NCAA national champions, have a
fall and spring combined schedule of 105 games plus conference and NCAA tournaments.
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The reality is that in big-time intercollegiate sports, as Alabama Coach
Bear Bryant has said, "[T]he boy is really an athlete first and a student
second." 108 Befitting this secondary status, NCAA regulations serve to,
guarantee only minimal performance of student responsibilities-
primarily the taking and completion of 12 credit hours of courses each
term. Other regulations prescribing that the student be in "good academic
standing" and make "satisfactory progress toward a degree" 109 rely on the
autonomous standards of individual instituti6ns to give them meaning.
Recent experience indicates that institutionsvinvolved in the intense comA
petition of intercollegiate athletics, when acting alone, are unlikely to im-
pose on themselves standards that might hinder their ability to compete.
As a result, such regulations, relying on autonomous action, are fre-
quently ineffective.
The uncomfortable truth is that the academic performance of athletes
has become "a national disgrace." 110 The forces contributing to the ero-
sion of academic standards in intercollegiate athletics are powerful and
will not be warded off by the relatively weak regulatory shield now im-
posed by the NCAA. Stronger rules and novel approaches are required if
the acadmmic. integrity of college athletics is to be restored.,
IV. LEGAL INITIATIVES
Seven former student-athletes are pursuing a novel approach in a Cali-
fornia court. " 1 They are suing officials of California State University at
Los Angeles for, among other things, failing to provide the higher educa-
tion promised when they agreed to bring their athletic talents to the uni-
versity." ' The athletes assert that this failure to educate breached con-
tractual duties owed by the university to them under individual oral and
written agreements and under NCAA rules.
The complaint alleges that a contract existed between each of the stu-
dent-athletes and the university, pursuant to which the student-athletes
agreed to provide their athletic services to the university for two to four
years in exchange for an equal number of years of tuition-and-cost-free
108. J. MICHENER, supra note 77, at 203 (1976).
109. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 3 reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 16.
110. Underwood, supra note 3, at 40.
111. See Echols v. Board of Trustees, California State University and Colleges, No. C 266 777
(Ca. Super. Ct., L.A. County, filed Oct. 22, 1979).
112. The complaint recites ten causes of action. In addition to the breach of contract claims
which are discussed in the text, the complaint asserts claims for cancellation of loans for fraud and
failure of consideration, misrepresentation, conversion, and assumpsit, and seeks injunctive relief
against state loan collection procedures on due process grounds. Id.
1982:791
98 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
education. 13 The complaint carefully defined what was required by the
promise of an education in terms of access to specific university services
and resources, rather than in terms of educational attainment." 4 The
achievement of an education is influenced by a host of factors, physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, and environmental which "affect the pu-
pil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the
control of its ministers."' " Thus, a university might do everything within
its power for an athlete who nonetheless fails to become educated."'
Thus, any deficiencies by the university will ordinarily have to be mea-
sured in terms of access to specific services or resources rather than
achievement.
California State University at Los Angeles was allegedly deficient in
providing the requisite access as follows: (1) It denied the athletes access
to adequate counseling services by instructing them "to seek counseling
solely from the coaches in the athletic department" and by prohibiting
them "from seeking counseling services from the traditional counseling
offices" of the university;" 7 (2) coaches instructed the athletes "not to
enroll in certain degree-requirement courses because such courses might
jeopardize their eligibility status;"'1 8 (3) they were instructed "to repeat
their enrollment in certain physical education courses even though such
courses would be a total waste" to them having been satisfactorily com-
pleted in prior terms;"8 (4) unlike other students, they were never advised
of the academic and course requirements for graduation; (5) they were
never given individual course programs reasonably constructed to allow
normal progress toward a degree; (6) they were counseled to accept
grades for courses they never attended, removing incentives for learning;
(7) and, they were denied access to remedial courses which were funda-
mental to their overcoming educational handicaps." Due to this conduct
by representatives of the university, the athletes assert that they failed to
make reasonable progress toward a degree and to receive the higher edu-
113. Id. at 11-12.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854, 861 (1976) (rejecting complaint for educational malpractice by high school graduate who could
read only at the fifth grade level). Accord Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 49 N.Y.2d
121, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391
N.E.2d 1352 (1979).
116. To paraphrase an old saying about a horse, you can lead a jock to class, but you can't make
him think.
117. See supra note !11, at 12 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. Id. at 13.
120. Id.
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cation that had been promised. 31
Whether this course of conduct will be legally significant depends at
the outset on whether there is a contractual relationship between the ath-
lete and the institution. The few courts that have considered the question
have concluded that the recipient of an athletic grant-in-aid has con-
tracted with the institution."" The terms of the contract may vary de-
pending on the specific representations that have been made. Typically,
however, the essence of the transaction is the exchange of the promise of
athletic services by the student for the reciprocal promise of educational
services by the institution. Weistart and Lowell have urged that the rela-
tionship should ordinarily be viewed, not as contractual, but as a tradi-
tional academic relationship in which the institution makes a conditional
gift to a promising student.1 23 The analysis, however, does not adequately
account for the reality that the student is recruited and the scholarship
granted only because of the expectation that he will perform in an extra-
curricular activity. If he fulfills the expectation, the university may reap
substantial rewards including increased revenues, alumni support, and na-
tional publicity. If, however, he chooses not to perform, the grant may be
cancelled.1 24
Consistent with the notion urged by Weistart and Lowell, the Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that in the absence of an explicit requirement
of athletic performance, an athletic scholarship is not regarded as com-
pensation for tax purposes.' s The conclusion has been aptly criticized as
"rather naive, ' ' s0 since athletic awards "are made to secure the athlete's
services and generally are maintained subject to his participation in col-
121. Id.
122. Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908, 909-10 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor
v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C. App. 117, 120, 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1972).
123. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 1.06, at 11-12 (1979).
124. The NCAA Constitution authorizes the cancellation of an athletic scholarship if the athlete
"voluntarily withdraws from a sport for personal reasons." NCAA CONST. art. 3. § 4-(c)-(2), re-
printed in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 19. Other rules limit the period of any scholarship
grant to one year. See NCAA CONsr. art. 3, § 4-(d), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL supra note 21, at
19-20. The only restriction on nonrenewal is procedural - the athlete is entitled to a hearing if he
believes his grant has not been renewed for "questionable reasons." NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 4-(g),
reprinted in NCAA MANUAL supra note 21, at 21. No attempt is made to define "questionable
reasons" and thereby give substance to the hearing requirement. AIAW rules are stricter, specifically
prohibiting the withdrawal or nonrenewal of financial aid because of "skill performance, illness or
injury." AIAW HANDBOOK 1980-1981 at 51. AIAW rules still permit terminating aid to any student
who voluntarily withdraws from the sport or for any other reason fails to participate for a year. Id. at
49, 50.
125. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
126. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 1430, 1462 (1980).
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lege athletics. 127
Even if the arrangement is characterized as a conditional gift, the
promise of educational benefits probably would still be legally enforceable
on an estoppel basis. The law recognizes that: "A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee . . . and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." '128 When a university promises to provide educational services to
an athlete if he will go to the school and play football, the promise will be
legally binding if the athlete, relying on the promise, attends the school
and plays football.12 9 Accordingly, if the California State student-athletes
are able to prove the allegations of their complaint, the law should pro-
vide a remedy, most likely under the contract theory asserted, but if not,
under a promissory estoppel theory.
One other legal basis for the claim merits only brief mention. The ath-
letes assert a cause of action as third party beneficiaries of a contract
between California State University at Los Angeles and the NCAA.130
That such a contract exists has support in the case law. Indeed, in a case
involving the university's sister school, California State University. at
Hayward, the California Court of Appeals found that the relationship be-
tween the NCAA and its member institutions is determined by contract,
the terms of which find expression in the constitution and bylaws of the
association.1 81 California State University at Los Angeles allegedly vio-
lated the NCAA Constitution and bylaws in several respects including:
failing to adhere to admission standards; arranging for third parties to
take standardized admission tests on behalf of plaintiffs; maintaining un-
official funds for disbursement to plaintiffs and other team members; fail-
ing to provide academic counseling; failing to provide plaintiffs with
course plans which could realistically be used in making reasonable pro-
127. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
129. The Restatement provides an appropriate illustration:
A, knowing that B is going to college, promises B that A will give him $5,000 on
completion of his course. B goes to college, and borrows and spends more than $5,000
for college expenses. When he has nearly completed his course, A notifies him of an
intention to revoke the promise. A's promise is binding and B is entitled to payment on
completion of the course without regard to whether his performance was "bargained
for" . ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS comment a, illustration 1 (1981).
130. See supra note 111, at 19-21.
131. Trustees of State Colleges and Universities v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461, 471, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 187, 192 (1978); California State University, Hayward v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d. 533, 541,
121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89-90 (1975).
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gress toward a degree; and requiring plaintiffs to spend more than the
allotted time in practice sessions.13 2
If these allegations are true, there is no doubt that NCAA rules, which
express the terms of the contract between the university and the NCAA,
have. been violated. It does not follow, however, that plaintiffs' claim as
third party beneficiaries has merit. On the contrary, the claim is probably
not sustainable because the "contract" sets forth the means by which the
rules are to be enforced and violations to be remedied. The Committee on
Infractions considers charges of violations and metes out punishment sat-
isfactory to the NCAA. 33 Like a party bound by an agreement for arbi-
tration' s4 or reasonable liquidated damages, 36 the NCAA would be lim-
ited to the remedies to which it and its member institutions have agreed:
the enforcement system prescribed by the NCAA Constitution and By-
laws. No greater remedy would be available to a third-party beneficiary
since such a person's rights are limited by the terms of the contract.13 6
Moreover only "intended beneficiaries" are entitled to sue as third par-
ties to a contract.3 7 Student-athletes are most reasonably regarded as
"incidental beneficiaries" who have no right to sue since they fail to meet
one of the prerequisites of an "intended beneficiary." To be an intended
beneficiary, recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary must
be appropriate to effectuate the intentions of the parties.138 In view of the
elaborate enforcement system established by the NCAA, it is doubtful
that giving student-athletes a supplemental judicial remedy would effectu-
ate the intentions of the NCAA and its member institutions.
The court thus should limit the student-athletes to a remedy for breach
of the promises expressly made to them by representatives of the univer-
sity. Although courts have been reluctant to interfere in the academic
affairs of universities,139 they have recognized on numerous occasions that
promises made by universities to students are legally enforceable. 4 For
132. See supra note 11l, at 20.
133. See NCAA CONST. art. 4, § 6, Bylaw and Interpretations of the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association 8-5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 21, at 29-30, 100-01.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345(0 (1981).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
136. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 364A, at 877 (3d ed. 1959). "Where the contract contains an
arbitration clause which is legally enforceable, the general view is that the beneficiary is bound
thereby to the same extent that the promisor is bound." Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 304, 315 (1981).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
-139. See University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 430 U.S. 964 (1978); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp.
936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Vt. 1965).
140. See, e.g., DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences, The Chicago Medical School, 40 Ill.
App. 3d 474, 479-80, 352 N.E.2d 356, 361-62 (1976); Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt, Chancery Court,
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example, in Zumbrun v. University of Southern California,1 4 1 the court
cited ten cases in support of the proposition that "the basic legal relation
between a student and a private university or college is contractual in
nature," with the "catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the
institution" being "a part of the contract."14 2 The court found that plain-
tiffs stated a cause of action for breach of the contract when the school
failed to provide the normal lectures and examinations in a sociology
course. Similarly, if California State University at Los Angeles, contrary
to official representations, failed to provide adequate counseling to its ath-
letes, denied them access to advertised remedial courses, and refused to
allow them to enroll in courses necessary to earn a degree, then a legal
remedy should be available.
The remedy the athletes seek is specific enforcement of the contract
and damages of $5,000 for each quarter of schooling lost. It seems doubt-
ful that they will be able to prove damages of that magnitude. Yet if they
are able, for example, to establish reasonably calculable lost earnings at-
tributable to the contract breach, then a substantial monetary award is
possible.14 The more likely and appropriate remedy would be to readmit
the athletes to the university with an order requiring the school to provide
the promised educational services along with necessary financial
assistance.
Whether such relief is ever granted in Echols v. Board of Trustees,
California State Universities and Colleges, the potential for similar judi-
cial action exists whenever a school fails to meet its academic obligations
to student-athletes. A university could minimize such self-imposed obliga-
tions through appropriate language in the tender of the athletic grant-in-
aid narrowly stating the academic promises of the institution and dis-
claiming all others. The university should not, however, be able to evade
its legal obligation to provide athletes, like other students, meaningful ac-
cess to faculty, courses, and books that could lead to a degree and a genu-
ine education.
Civil liability for breach of contract is not the only legal sanction poten-
tially available for abuses in intercollegiate athletics. Ben Apuna, a for-
mer linebacker at Arizona State University, has filed a lawsuit against his
academic adviser and other officials of the university for fraud, negli-
Davidson County, Tennessee, No. A8525, Aug. 15, 1977, summarized in H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN,
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 430-32 (1979).
141. 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1972).
142. Id. at 504.
143. In Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt, the court recognized that, if proved, a student may recover lost
earnings from a university that fails to meet its academic obligations. See H. EDWARDS & V.
NORDIN, supra note 140, at 432.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN ATHLETICS
gence, and interference with contract because of circumstances arising
from the 1979 scandal."' Apuna had registered for a summer course at
Rocky Mountain College. Allegedly on the advice and with the assistance
of his academic adviser, he attended no classes, did no work, and received
a B for the course. 14 He was subsequently suspended, along with seven
fellow Arizona State football players, for receiving academic credits ille-
gitimately. He now seeks $2.4 million in damages because of the alleged
adverse impact the suspension and scandal have had on his professional
football career. 146
Curtis Jones, a former prep basketball star in Detroit, has filed another
lawsuit premised on academic abuses but raising different concerns. 14 7 He
has sued the University of Michigan, North Idaho Junior College, and
various high school and college coaches and officials for contributing to
his mental breakdown through, among other things, the following alleged
course of conduct: arranging his transfer at age fifteen from a school for
slow learners to a regular junior high school where he could not and did
not receive the special help he needed, for the sole purpose of exploiting
his basketball talent; passing him through junior and senior high school
although he did not do passing work in class, solely to maintain his bas-
ketball eligibility; inducing and assisting him to attend North Idaho Jun-
ior College, though he could not read or write well enough even to fill out
the application (his high school coach did it for him); and cheating on
examinations and otherwise improperly maintaining his junior college eli-
gibility.148 During Jones' second year in junior college, large segments of
the student body learned that he could not read or write and began to
insult and taunt him mercilessly. In the face of this psychological pres-
sure, he suffered a complete mental breakdown, triggering psychosis and
schizophrenia, for which he has required constant medical supervision
since 1970. He seeks to recover damages exceeding $15,000,000 on sev-
eral legal theories including educational malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, intentional infliction of mental distress, and denial of the
right to an education. 149
In addition to such civil actions,15 0 it may occasionally be possible to
144. Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 25, 1981. at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id.




150. The problem of protecting academic standards was addressed in early 1982 in an unusual
civil suit that, in effect, saw the court intervene against the imposition of academic requirements for
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pursue criminal penalties for certain misconduct in the administration of
intercollegiate athletics. In 1981, a New Mexico state court tried the Uni-
versity of New Mexico's former basketball coach, Norm Ellenberger, on
22 counts of fraud and filing false public vouchers.151 Ellenberger billed
the university for several thousand dollars of nonexistent travel expenses
and then used the "extra money," he said, to help support the school's
basketball program.15 2 He was convicted of 21 of the 22 counts and could
have received up to 105 years in prison; he received one year of un-
supervised probation without having to make restitution. " In explaining
the light sentence, Judge Phillip Baiamonte said:
I'm being asked to sentence a man who was only one cog in the entire
machine called college ball. I'm being asked to sentence a man be-
cause he got caught, not because his conduct was unacceptable. The
question is how fair is it to incarcerate a man for doing what almost
everyone in the community wanted him to do - namely win basket-
ball games at whatever cost. Naturally, rules and laws were broken. Is
anyone really surprised? This is a problem that probably exists at
every major college and university in the country.'"
The judge urged "the nation's colleges and universities to get out of the
business of conducting professional athletics and go back to the academics
for which they were established."155
The "feathery tap on the wrist"18' given to Ellenberger has been much
criticized. Regardless of its wisdom, it serves to illustrate the limitations
of the criminal justice system in responding to misconduct in college
sports. Such misconduct will rarely offend the criminal law and even in
those relatively few instances when it does, punishment is by no means
assured.
Intercollegiate athletics are not and should not be immune from the
constraints imposed by civil and criminal law on the rest of society. The
reality, though, is that those general laws are unlikely to be fully enforced
against popular coaches and universities. And even if they were, because
an athlete. Mark Hall, a senior guard on the Minnesota Gophers basketball team, was rejected for
admission to a degree granting program at the university on the reported grounds that his academic
performance had not been adequate. He sought and obtained a temporary restraining order from U.S.
District Judge Miles Lord on the theory that his rights to due process had been violated. N.Y. Times,
'Jan. 4, 1982, § C, at 11, col. I.
151. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 20, 1982, at 7
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. N.Y. Times, supranote 150.
155. Id.
156. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, supra note 151, at 7.
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they are general and do not directly address the most serious problems in
intercollegiate athletics, they would do little to improve the situation.
What is needed is not more civil and criminal litigation but enforceable
NCAA regulations that specifically respond to the special circumstances
of college sports.
V. REMEDIAL REGULATION
The first regulatory step that should be taken toward returning aca-
demic integrity to intercollegiate athletics is tightening admission require-
ments to preclude enrollment of young men who are illiterate or otherwise
unqualified to do academic work. Instead of being satisfied with a mere
2.000 high school grade point average, the NCAA should require that a
freshman who receives an athletic grant-in-aid to a Divison I university
demonstrate real academic competence through a high school transcript
with at least a 2.50 average, or performance on the SAT or ACT which,
considered in combination with the high school average, would predict
satisfactory performance in college, academic coursework.1 5 7 In other
words, the NCAA should return to something similar to, but stronger
than, the old 1.600 Rule. Simultaneously, the NCAA should end the
abuse of affirmative action programs in the service of athletic ends by
making the percentage of athletes admitted under such standards propor-
tionate to the percentage admitted by the school for the entire incoming
class. For example, if the university limits special admissions to 4% of the
incoming class, then only 4% of the incoming scholarship athletes should
be admitted under these more lenient standards.1
If implemented, one impact of these changes probably would be to re-
duce athletic scholarships available to disadvantaged black youth.1" This
may seem harsh, but it is in the long-run best interest of both the athlete
and NCAA institutions. Experience demonstrates that the athlete, black
or white, who fails to meet the ordinary entrance requirements of a col-
lege will usually fail to earn either an education or a degree. He is, in
reality, being exploited by the institution for his athletic talent and receiv-
ing nothing of real consequence in return. There is, of course, the possibil-
157. The American Football Coaches Association has suggested a related proposal, known as the
"triple option". It "would begin initially with a 2.25 grade-point-average requirement, instead of the
present 2.0. If a high school graduate didn't have that, he could qualify for a scholarship by having
either a combined verbal and math SAT score of 750 or a 17 on the ACT." SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Ma 19. l980,-at-4I-L
158. Id.
159. In fact, Harry Edwards contends that earlier NCAA legislation reducing the limits on ath-
letic scholarships was unfair to blacks because its impact was greatest on those perceived as "aca-
demic risks." Edwards, Sport within the Veil. ANNALS 116, 122 (1979).
1982:79]
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
ity of using college as a steppingstone to professional sports, but the
chances are so remote that it is an illusion for all but the truly exceptional
athletes.) 0 If such athletes are unable to meet these standards, minor
leagues are now available in all sports but football and even there, the
aspiring athlete may hone his talents in junior college while attempting to
raise his grades for the big-time. The institution, of course, will benefit
from these tougher standards by the enhancement of perhaps its most pre-
cious asset, the integrity of its academic program.
Beyond strengthening admission standards, the NCAA should act, to
require further proof that an athlete is making real progress toward a
degree. Specifically, the NCAA should supplement its new normal pro-
gress rule with the requirement that the athlete progress in a program of
studies through which he can qualify for a baccalaureate degree within no
more than five years.1 61 The rule should include language to insure that
notwithstanding a change in an athlete's major, he will still be on course
to receive a degree within five years. Experience in the Big Ten has
demonstrated that such qualitative requirements are effective in raising
the graduation rate of student-athletes." 2
The NCAA should also act to reduce the control which athletic depart-
ments now have over the student-athlete's academic life. Academic coun-
seling for athletes should be removed from the athletic departments where
the dominant interest is in the athlete's eligibility for sports competition.
Accordingly, he is often channeled into courses which serve the end of
eligibility but are not necessarily consistent with the athlete's educational
needs or goals. Counselors, outside the athletic department's domain,
would be more likely to give these educational concerns higher priority.'"
In addition, the NCAA should strive to further limit the demands of ath-
letics to leave more time for the athlete's academic pursuits.
While helpful, these relatively modest reforms are no panacea. A regu-
lation offering the potential for real change in the conduct of intercollegi-
ate athletics is one that would restrict athletic scholarships in accordance
with the percentage of athletes who graduate. Penalizing athletic depart-
ments by taking away scholarships when athletes fail to graduate would
160. Each year only about 150 football players (out of 41,000 on NCAA varsity rosters) and 50
basketball players (out of 15,000 on NCAA varsity rosters) go to the pros from college. On the
average, they play 4.2 seasons in football and 3.4 seasons in basketball. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, supra
note 3, at 60.
161. See Legislative Proposal No. 30, Program, NCAA Convention (1981) (proposal of Big Ten
Conference Universities).
162. Comments of Gwendolyn Norell, Faculty Athletic Representative, Michigan State Univer-
sity, on the floor of the NCAA Convention (Jan. 13, 1981).
163. See THE HANFORD REPORT, supra note 88, at Appendix 141.
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Idd a powerful incentive to encourage the enrollment of only athletes whohad demonstrated the potential to graduate and to make sure that they
progress toward a degree during their years of athletic eligibility.'" Such
a proposal would have to be carefully framed since it could prove in prac-
tice to be counterproductive if, for example, the penalty were imposed
only as to athletes who had completed four years of eligibility. To avoid
the penalty, coaches might employ the various means at their disposal to
induce the mediocre athlete to leave school prior to his fourth year.168 If
crafted with care, though, such a proposal could dramatically alter the
academic character of intercollegiate athletics.
The effectiveness of each of these proposals depends not only on the
soundness of its content but also on the adequacy of its enforcement. An
unenforceable rule is probably worse than no rule because only the honor-
able will comply to their disadvantage. 1 6 Accordingly, an enforcement
plan and an infusion of enforcement resources adequate to insure compli-
ance should accompany any expansion of the protection afforded aca-
demic standards. This may require, for example, regular sworn reports to
the NCAA disclosing the admissions credentials, courses, and grades of
every athlete receiving an NCAA grant-in-aid. Any misrepresentations in
such reports would subject the athlete and institution to severe sanctions.
A few serious observers of intercollegiate sports have suggested that
any effort to impose real academic standards is hopeless and that the only
solution is to end the hypocrisy by acknowledging and approving profes-
sionalism at least in big-time college football and basketball. 167 In other
words, cut the tie between athletes and academics; pay the players and
make no effort to require that they be students while giving them the
opportunity to take courses if they wish. But treating the athletic depart-
164. It is conceivable that some institutions might respond to this change by more readily grant-
ing degrees to undeserving athletes with the result that corruption is extended rather than reduced.
The reluctance of institutions to do so in the past indicates that there would be considerable resistance
to such a development. It is precisely the power of that resistance which is needed to bolster academic
standards for athletes.
165. See G. SHAW, MEAT ON THE HOOF (1972) (explaining how football coaches at the Univer-
sity of Texas used various techniques to induce athletes to quit football early in their careers and give
up their scholarships so that the scholarship could be committed to others).
166. G. Lueschen, a distinguished sports sociologist, has observed, "[T]he rewards that are at
stake in a contest will determine the amount and severity of cheating." SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ATHLET-
ics 70 (D. Landers ed. 1976). Given the sizeable rewards now available to the successful big-time
college athletic programs, it is not surprising that some institutions have not only exploited the inade-
quate rules which now exist, but have cheated as well and can be expected to continue to cheat unless
enforcement is effective.
167. E.g., J. MICHENER, supra note 77, at 199 (1976); J. ROONEY, THE RECRUITING GAME159-
85 (1980).
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ment "as if it were a Burger King franchise" 1" serves no legitimate goals
of-a-university. It may make money, but that is not the object of higher
education. A university's primary function is to educate. Only if college
athletics involve genuine students in an activity having educational merit
should the universities be involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Intercollegiate sports possess significant educational potential for the
athlete. From it, he may learn how to work with a group, to discipline
himself, to pick himself up after being knocked down, and to develop
competitive desire. He may experience the sense of fulfillment from giving
his best effort in the pursuit of excellence and the freedom to express
intense emotions in the thrill of victory or the agony of defeat. He may
learn to appreciate the importance of commitment, of hard work, and of
perseverence, and hemay acquire specific knowledge and skills to be used
in a career as a physical educator, coach, or professional athlete. While
serving these educational ends, intercollegiate sports can also entertain
and inspire thousands of spectators yielding immense revenues and pres-
tige to the successful university. When it does, the temptation is great,
perhaps irresistible, to lose sight of the educational goals in the pursuit of
such laurels. Some colleges and universities have yielded to that tempta-
tion with the consequent denigration of academic standards in their ath-
letic programs. 69 Other institutions, in order to compete effectively, have
felt compelled to do likewise. For the same reason, it is unrealistic to ex-
pect institutions on their own to raise academic standards for their ath-
letes. To succeed, the remedy must be collective, through regulation by
the NCAA. The present regulatory scheme is inadequate to the task; it
must be significantly strengthened and supplemented 'if we-are-toa-hieve
academic integrity in college athletics befitting America's great institu-
tions of higher education.
i68. Sports Illustrated, supra note 3, at 72.
169. USC Report, supra note 4, at 1.
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